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a b s t r a c t
Wang and Hu [B. Wang and Y. Hu, Quadratic compact knapsack public-key cryptosystem,
Comput. Math. Appl. 59 (1) (2010) 194–206] proposed a knapsack-type public-key
cryptosystem by introducing an easy quadratic compact knapsack problem and then using
the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise the easy knapsack instant. In this paper, we
present a heuristic stereotyped message attack that allows the cryptanalyst to recover
the plaintext message when partial information about the original message is known.
In particular, as shown by our experiments, for the proposed system parameter n = 100
which corresponds to a block length of 400 bits, exposing 60% of the plaintext allows the
cryptanalyst to recover the remaining 160 bits of the message with a success probability of
about 90% in about 2 hours.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Knapsack-based cryptosystems [1,2] were among the first public-key systems to be invented. Their seemingly NP-
completeness nature and their high encryption/decryption speed made them very attractive. However, it was soon realized
that the underlying knapsacks often have a low density [3] and hence they are vulnerable to lattice reduction attacks [4,5].
In [6], Wang and Hu proposed a knapsack-type public-key cryptosystem by introducing an easy quadratic compact
knapsack problem and then using the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise the easy knapsack instant as a seemingly
hard one. The authors showed that their cryptosystem achieves a high knapsack density [3] under the relinearization attack
model. Furthermore, by showing that the underlying compact knapsack problem always has exponentially many solutions,
they argued that it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to find all the solutions among which the attacker expects
to pick out the plaintext. They also provided some analysis that shows that the proposed cryptosystem is secure against
brute-force attacks and some known key-recovery attacks including simultaneous Diophantine approximation attacks and
orthogonal lattice attacks [7].
In this paper, we present a heuristic attack against this system. Our attack allows the cryptanalyst to recover the plaintext
message if part of it is exposed. Practically, this attack is applicable for situations where the encrypted messages have a
specific structure (also referred to as stereotyped messages [8–10]). For example, the plaintext message that sends a daily
session key may have the form ‘‘The secret for August 14, 2010 is ∗ ∗ ∗∗’’ where the actual secret is unknown. Similarly, a
message that sends an account registration confirmation may have the form ‘‘Your login name is ∗ ∗ ∗∗ and your password
is ∗ ∗ ∗∗’’.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the relevant properties of the quadratic compact knapsack
scheme is given in the next section. Our attack is described in Section 3 and the computational experimental results that
confirm its effectiveness are presented in Section 4.
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2. Description of the quadratic compact knapsack Scheme
In this section, we briefly review the features of the quadratic compact knapsack public-key system that are relevant
to our attack. Further details about the encryption and decryption operations as well as the key setup can be found in
[6].
The plaintext message is encoded such that M = (m1, . . . ,mn) and mi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15} is encoded in 4 bits. Then the
ciphertext is calculated as
c =
n−
i=1
fim2i , (1)
where F = (f1, . . . , fn)tr is the system public key generated by the key generation algorithm and tr denotes the transpose
operation. For the purpose of our cryptanalysis, the details of the key generation algorithm are irrelevant and we only
need to note that, given the system parameters’ specification in [6], fi ≈ 2252 n2 (60.86)n−1. It is clear that an exhaustive
search for the plaintext message would require 16n = 24n steps. A better meet-in-the-middle attack [2,3] requires n16n/2
steps.
While the encryption operation as defined by (1) is a nonlinear function in the plaintext vector, the attacker can obtain
a linear function just by setting yi = m2i and then try to attack the linearized version given by
c =
n−
i=1
fiyi, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 225. (2)
However, in [6], it was shown that the density of the above system is given by
d ≈ n⌈log2226⌉
log2(2253n360.86n−1)
(3)
which is, for practical values of n, high enough to prevent low density attacks. Furthermore, this class of attacks is very
unlikely to succeed in finding the original message M because many other vectors in the corresponding attack lattice are
shorter thanM [6].
The suggested security parameter for this system (n = 100) corresponds to a public-key size of about 6157 bits, and
knapsack density of about 1.27 which is sufficiently high to prevent low density attacks. Furthermore, according to the
analysis presented in [6], because of the non-injectivity property of the system, the low density subset-sum attack can find
the valid plaintext only with probability ≈ 1
2151
.
3. The proposed attack
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rm. In particular any subgroup of Zm is a lattice and such lattices are called
integer lattices. In other words, a lattice consists of all integral linear combinations of a set of linearly independent vectors,
i.e.,
L =

d−
i=1
aibi|ai ∈ Z

,
where the bi’s are linearly independent over Rm. Such a set of vectors bi is called a lattice basis. All the bases have the same
number, d = dim(L), of elements, called the dimension or rank of the lattice.
Given an integer lattice basis as input, the goal of the lattice basis reduction algorithm is to find a basis with short, nearly
orthogonal vectors. Although determining the shortest basis is possibly an NP-complete problem, algorithms such as the
LLL algorithm [5] can find a short basis in polynomial time with guaranteed worst-case performance. The reader is referred
to [4,11] for basic background on lattices in Zm and various applications of lattice reduction in cryptography. Throughout
the rest of this section, we describe the details of our proposed attack.
While there exists no efficient algorithm for solving a general quadratic Diophantine equation [12,13], the specific
constraints imposed on the solution space, i.e., the fact thatmi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15}, allows us to develop a heuristic algorithm
to recover the plaintext message if part ofM, say,M′ = (mii ,mi2 , . . . ,mil), is known.
It should be noted that for the traditional knapsack systems, partial exposure of the message can be utilized, almost in
a trivial way, to reduce the dimensions of the lattice used in attacking these systems. However, for the quadratic knapsack
system under consideration, utilizing the knowledge of M′ to directly attack a smaller instance of the knapsack in the
form of Eq. (1) using the traditional lattice reduction-based attack (where the unknown vector would be of length n − l
instead of n) does not allow us to recover the remaining unknown coordinates ofM since, as explained in [6], the unknown
vector is very likely to be larger than the basis of the reduced lattice. Our proposed attack proceeds in the following
steps:
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1. Formulate an initial basis B as follows:
B =

In×n −d1 × F
01×n −d1 × c

, (4)
where I denotes the identity matrix, and c denotes the ciphertext corresponding to the partially exposed message.
Choosing the constant d1 large enough [11] ensures that the reduced (row) basis corresponding to Bwill be in the form
Bˆ =

An×n 0n×1
x1×n d1

. (5)
Remark 1. Let Y denote the vector (m21, . . . ,m
2
n). The structure of B and Bˆ implies that Y can be presented as an integer
linear combination of the rows of A. On the other hand, because of the properties of the reduced basis Bˆ, the rows of
the matrix A are short and nearly orthogonal. Furthermore, since the vector Y is also relatively short, one expects it to
be likely to be presented as a small integer linear combination of the rows of A, i.e., one expects to find that Y can be
presented as
Y = s× A (6)
where s is a relatively short integer vector. GivenM, one can recover s by solving a set of linear equations. However, since
only partial information aboutM is assumed to be known to the attacker, the number of possible solutions that one has
to examine in order to find s is expected to be exponentially large. In order to overcome this problem, we use the lattice
reduction algorithm one more time to find s.
2. LetM′ = (mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mil) denote the exposed l components ofM (which are not necessarily contiguous) and let A′ be
the n× lmatrix constructed from the l columns of A corresponding to the known coefficients inM, i.e., A′[i][j] = A[i][ij],
i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , l. Form the basis
C =

In×n −d2 × A′n×l
01×n −d2 × Y′1×l

(7)
where Y′ = (m2ii ,m2i2 , . . . ,m2il). Again, the proper choice of the constant d2 [11] ensures that the reduced basis
corresponding to Bwill be in the form
Cˆ =

S(n+1−l)×n 0(n+1−l)×l
zl×n −d2 ×Πl×l

(8)
whereΠ is a permutation matrix. The 0(n+1−l)×l on the top right corner of Cˆ guarantees that the first l columns of each
row of S× A is equal to Y′ or an integer multiple of it.
3. Check whether any of the rows of the matrix S × A satisfy the constraints on the message M, i.e., with elements in the
form of m2j ,mj ∈ {1, . . . , 15}. If such a condition is satisfied, let s denote the corresponding row in S and declare s × A
as the original plaintext message; otherwise return (FAILURE).
The above steps are illustrated using the same example that the authors in [6] gave to support their argument about the
security of their proposed system.
Example 1. Let
F = (11983552636085612996, 10999467547886443030, 15792325467390277628,
10445813110882639381, 9252643203486974008, 17826100034189837380,
1136144594347297305, 1012216192024971939, 10263527667452230037)tr ,
M = (3, 7, 15, 8, 6, 9, 11, 13, 10), and c = 7980531210038881739482. Following the steps of our attack, the initial basis
B is given by
B =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d1 × f1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d1 × f2
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d1 × f3
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −d1 × f4
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −d1 × f5
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −d1 × f6
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −d1 × f7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −d1 × f8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −d1 × f9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d1 × c

.
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For d1 = 100 000, the reduced basis matrix corresponding to B is given by
Bˆ =

0 31 31 −20 19 −45 −13 −1 2 0
0 −31 31 20 −4 −32 −15 −10 27 0
−68 34 17 −26 23 10 5 −4 5 0
0 31 31 42 −43 −47 2 −5 −3 0
0 0 0 31 62 −32 3 −2 −32 0
0 31 −93 73 20 −18 −111 1 61 0
−77 −77 −84 −81 −99 −87 −5 −188 −134 0
1648 1349 2229 933 789 2862 −1590 −3755 −444 0
2785 2846 −2315 519 2199 −508 7169 −7420 6456 0
−1135 −1117 304 −334 −816 −297 −1933 2839 −1863 100 000

.
Without loss of generality, assume that the first four coordinates ofM are known to the attacker. Then, with d2 = 10 000,
we form the basis
C =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d2A[1][1] −d2A[1][2] −d2A[1][3] −d2A[1][4]
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d2A[2][1] −d2A[2][2] −d2A[2][3] −d2A[2][4]
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d2A[3][1] −d2A[3][2] −d2A[3][3] −d2A[3][3]
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −d2A[4][1] −d2A[4][2] −d2A[4][3] −d2A[4][4]
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −d2A[5][1] −d2A[5][2] −d2A[5][3] −d2A[5][4]
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −d2A[6][1] −d2A[6][2] −d2A[6][3] −d2A[6][4]
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −d2A[7][1] −d2A[7][2] −d2A[7][3] −d2A[7][4]
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −d2A[8][1] −d2A[8][2] −d2A[8][3] −d2A[8][4]
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −d2A[9][1] −d2A[9][2] −d2A[9][3] −d2A[9][4]
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −d2m21 −d2m22 −d2m23 −d2m24

=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −310 000 −310 000 200 000
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 310 000 −310 000 −200 000
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 680 000 −340 000 −170 000 260 000
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 310 000 310 000 420 000
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −310 000
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −310 000 930 000 −730 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 770 000 770 000 840 000 810 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −16 480 000 −13 490 000 −22 290 000 −9330 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 350 000 11 170 000 −3040 000 3340 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −90 000 −490 000 −2250 000 −640 000

.
Then the reduced basis corresponding to C is given by
Cˆ =

1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 −1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 1 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
270 22 232 −596 164 181 402 81 70 0 0 0 0
300 −123 −547 −111 −94 −342 −518 −88 −55 0 0 0 0
−302 806 −985 −147 225 −633 906 −198 −271 0 0 0 0
28 −194 −21 229 −127 −22 −447 −12 14 −d2 0 0 0
−87 394 −349 −233 160 −216 582 −62 −102 0 0 −d2 0
−233 158 −67 215 9 −57 166 −32 −50 0 −d2 0 0
181 −106 172 −242 31 124 1 51 59 0 0 0 −d2

.
Finally we have
S× A
=

0 0 0 0 186 −62 −9 0 −59
−9 −49 −225 −64 −36 −81 −121 −169 −100
0 0 0 0 31 −93 −172 −14 154
−1665 −9065 −41 625 −11 840 50 590 −66 675 125 289 535 710 162 787
8541 46 501 213 525 60 736 94 651 386 466 −422 351 183 495 −147 024
−17 505 −95 305 −437 625 −124 480 23 027 −265 575 608 468 −190 273 372 141
 .
It is clear that the second row of the matrix above corresponds to the original message M and the second row in S
corresponds to s = (1,−1,−1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) in (6). One should also note that M might be recovered even if less than
four coordinates of it were exposed to the attacker. For example, knowing M′ = (m2,m3,m4) allows the recovery of the
rest ofM using the same procedure as above.
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4. Computational experiments
The structure of the basis C used in the second step of the attack implies that the attack fails only in situations
corresponding to the cases where there are at least (n + 1 − l) vectors in the form wi = vi × A, i = 1, . . . , n + 1 − l,
whose first l coordinates are given by Y′ or an integer multiple of it and vi is shorter than s. Consequently, the vector s will
not show in the reduced basis Cˆ. Because of the heuristic nature of the lattice reduction algorithm, determining an analytical
expression for the probability of this event, and consequently the failure probability of our attack, seems to be an intractable
problem. However, it is intuitively expected that increasing l should improve the probability of success (i.e., as l → n,
prob(success)→ 1) since the existence probability of such short vectors,wi, i = 1, . . . , n+ 1− l, with such constraints on
its first l coordinates should diminish as l increases.
In this section, we provide some experimental results that confirm the effectiveness of our proposed attack. The
performance of our attackwas evaluated usingMaple version 10 on a lenovoX61 laptop running Intel CoreDuoCPU@1.6GHz
with 2 GB of memory.
For small values of n ≤ 50, our attack succeeds with a good probability even if the exposed portion of the message, l,
is less than n/2. On the other hand, for practical large values of n, the attack succeeds with non-negligible probability only
when l exceeds n/2. In particular, assuming that 60% of the original plaintext is pre-exposed to the cryptanalyst, for n = 80,
our attack always succeeded in recovering the remaining (0.4 × 4 × 80 = 128) message bits in about 86 min on average.
For the suggested security parameter, n = 100, our attack succeeded in recovering the remaining 4× 40 = 160 bits of the
message for 9 out of 10 cases in about 121 min on average.
5. Conclusions
The security level of the quadratic compact knapsack public-key cryptosystem proposed by Wang and Hu is
overestimated. In particular, for the suggested value of the system parameters, our stereotyped message attack allows the
cryptanalyst to efficiently recover the unknownpart of the plaintextwith high success probability if about 60% of the original
message was known to the attacker.
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